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‘Developmental nationalism?’ Political trust and the politics
of large-scale land investment in Magufuli’s Tanzania
Atenchong Talleh Nkobou and Andrew Ainslie
School of Agriculture, Policy & Development, University of Reading, Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
Research on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) can provide valuable
insights into the support for developmental nationalism in Tanzania
today. ‘Developmental nationalism’ is ‘a creative variant of liberation’,
which purports to make ‘Tanzania great again’. The nationalist turn
of late President Magufuli was grounded in political ideology and the
selective history of the past that swept him to power. However, there
is limited research on how political practice around land investments
contribute to trust and support for public institutions. This paper
makes two key contributions to scholarship on the political economy
of LSLIs. First, we examine the messy politics of LSLIs, the failures in
design and implementation, and the rise in local support for
developmental nationalism in two rural settings in Tanzania. Second,
using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), we identify distinct groups of
individuals based on their trust in the President, the ruling party
(CCM), the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and support for LSLIs.
We define political trust as ‘an evaluative orientation towards an
institution or government, based on people’s normative expectations’.
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Research on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) shows that land investments are unques-
tionably political, particularly within statist land tenure regimes in Africa.1 Schlimmer
demonstrates how the ‘land grab’ discourse became a talking point during the 2015 presi-
dential elections in Tanzania.2 Cliffe et al. explain how the Fast Track Land Reform Pro-
gramme (FTLRP) in the early 2000s shaped and reformed Zimbabwe’s political and
economic environment.3 In countries where ‘land laws are centralised, and land is
vested in the president as trustee’, the direct involvement of government agents and
officials in land allocation and dispute resolution can foster the politicisation of LSLIs.4
However, there is limited research on how political practice around land investments
contributes to the trust and support for public institutions in the Global South. The direct
involvement of state agents and officials in land transactions can transform land invest-
ments into a tool for politicians to garner political support.5 For example, Bélair describes
the land transfer process in Tanzania as ‘political’, with rural communities frequently dis-
possessed of land and the ‘public interest’ used to justify expropriation.6
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This paper makes two key contributions to research on the politics of LSLIs. First, we
examine the politics of LSLIs, the failures in design and implementation, and the rise in
support for ‘developmental nationalism’ in two rural communities in the Ruvuma region
of Tanzania. Second, using household data, we employ a latent class analysis (LCA) to
identify groups distinguished based on their trust in the President, the Tanzania Invest-
ment Centre (TIC), in the ruling political party Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and their
support for LSLIs. To determine if there is a significant difference between the classes
identified in the LCA, we employ McNemar’s dependent Z-test. We define political
trust as ‘an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government based on
people’s normative expectations’.7 Like Paget, we argue that as the insurgent leader of
CCM, late President John P. Magufuli instrumentalised developmental nationalism as
a political tool to increase political support among rural communities, already disillu-
sioned by unfulfilled promises within LSLI schemes.8
Paget describes this developmental nationalism as ‘a creative variant of liberation’,
which purports to make ‘Tanzania great again’.9 By ‘liberation’, Paget describes a form
of progressive restorationist ideology under Magufuli’s regime, which breaks away
from an ‘old order’ laissez-faire economy that has disenfranchised the majority of small-
holder farmers for over 20 years.10 Developmental nationalism is versatile, mutable and
legitimised Magufuli’s authoritarian rule in the eyes of his supporters.11 The nationalist
turn of Magufuli was grounded in political ideology and a selective history of the past.
For one, an article in The Economist describes Magufuli’s leadership style as having
had ‘a whiff of African Socialism’.12 Cheeseman argues that Magufuli’s leadership did
not represent an actual break with the past but can be understood in the context of
the country’s return to a more statist economic approach, last experienced under
Nyerere.13 For Magufuli to legitimise his decisions, he drew on the revered legacy of
Nyerere, which led some authors to qualify his actions as ‘post-socialism’.14
How did this manifest? The President publicly attacked foreign and local private
investors as corrupt and succeeded in presenting himself as fighting for the poor
against a corrupt business and political elite.15 The high levels of distrust in political insti-
tutions, which were evident in the run-up to the 2015 election,16 were demonstrated by
ordinary people who perceive public institutions like the TIC as favouring powerful and
corrupt investors against local community members.17 For analytical purposes, we
present the TIC as representing ‘old order’ laissez-faire institutions that advocate for a
neoliberal and open economy in favour of LSLIs.18 On the other hand, Magufuli intro-
duced a ‘business unusual’ approach to investments which was supposedly aimed at cor-
recting the shortfalls in Tanzania’s relationship with investors,19 a form of developmental
nationalism.
Institutions like the TIC have encouraged LSLIs to increase foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI), farmers’ incomes, technology transfer, and job creation.20 However,
local communities, disillusioned by the broken promises of these LSLIs,21 expressed
a kind of wistfulness and nostalgia that can apparently only be brought back by a
restorationist form of developmental nationalism, as expressed by Magufuli.22 The
negative impacts of LSLIs on the rights of local communities,23 and the absence of ade-
quate political tools oriented to holding investors accountable for the promises made to
local people,24 place public institutions and citizens in a constant struggle for political
legitimacy and support.25
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 379
Considering the analytical challenges in measuring ‘political trust’,26 our paper accepts
certain analytical assumptions. We do not generalise our findings. However, by using two
rural communities, one where a LSLI project has been implemented and another where
the investment project has not been implemented, our research provides valuable
insights into the politics of LSLIs in rural communities in Tanzania. In the next
section, we elaborate on the analytical and data collection techniques used in measuring
political trust as a latent variable for political support.
Measuring ‘political trust’ as a latent variable for political support
Challenges abound in measuring political trust as a latent variable for government
support within social science research.27 In looking at the trends in political trust
within new and stable democracies, Catterberg and Moreno also define political trust
as ‘citizen’s confidence in political institutions’.28 Our analysis focuses on smallholders’
evaluative orientation towards institutions based on their expectations of the promises
made within LSLI schemes. However, trust is a subjective and normatively charged
concept.29 What constitutes a trustworthy institution is likely to differ among citizens
within different cultural and governance regime contexts.
To mitigate contextual misinterpretations in our study, we focus on two rural commu-
nities in the same local administrative region. Fieldwork was carried out from May to
September 2018, following a three-week-long pilot study in December 2017. Previous
visits by the first author to these communities in 2014 as part of his MSc research
proved valuable in understanding local dynamics and for carrying out research ‘where
context specificity is essential’.30 Like James Scott, we assume that our sample community
is fashioned from the same everyday realities, and their divergent experiences and inter-
ests form part of the same community of discourse and practice.31 Our political trust
analysis within the same regional and socio-cultural context thus minimises ‘measure-
ment errors’, which may occur when such studies are done across cultural and regime
settings.32 Village 1 is 50 miles away from Village 2 and falls within the same ethnolin-
guistic, cultural and political economy context.
The choice of Village 1 is attributed to its proximity to a functioning 1,999 ha large-
scale farm, whilst Village 2 is adjacent to a failed investment project of about 20,000 ha.
Foreign and local private investors have made investments in Villages 1 and 2, respect-
ively. Both villages are located within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tan-
zania (SAGCOT), a public-private partnership scheme launched in May 2010 by
President Jakaya Kikwete.33 The SAGCOT covers 350,000 ha of ‘profitable land’ and
aims to produce 680,000 tonnes of field crops (maise, tea, soya and wheat), 630,000
tonnes of rice, 4.4 million tonnes of sugarcane, 3,500 tonnes of red meat and 32,000
tonnes of high-value fruits by 2030.34
Data collection
We used different techniques to collect data on the perception of local communities.
First, we relied on key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Key
informant interviews (n = 18) were conducted using unstructured interviews with
village elders, representatives of farmers’ based organisations, academia, state and local
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government officials. The key informants were selected through a snowballing technique.
The FGDs (n = 7) helped us understand how local community members perceived land
investment policy design and implementation and why they consequently challenged the
performance of the LSLI schemes in their communities. FGD participants were selected
from each village hamlet to allow for fair and equal geographical representation across
the villages (see Maps 1 and 2). Where possible, an elder with informed knowledge of
the village history was preferred for the FGD.
In Village 1, FGDs were organised with the 14 participants equally split into two
groups of seven males and seven females. However, in Village 2, where another 14 par-
ticipants were selected, the FGD was limited to one session (of 2 hours) with male and
female participants because of the abrupt termination of the first author’s research
permit.35 Additionally, grey data and documents such as letters between villagers and
government officials, minutes of village meetings and land use maps were obtained
from village members and subjected to content and thematic analysis. The documents
were also used as prompts during FGDs.
Second, with the help of two research assistants (one male and one female), we admi-
nistered a standard Swahili-translated ‘trust in government’ survey to households in both
communities. Questions were translated beforehand from English to Swahili to minimise
inconsistencies that can occur when questions are translated independently by inter-
viewers. Table 1 shows a statistical description of interviewees by age, gender and edu-
cational level. An average of three adults per household was interviewed in 112
households in Village 1 and 75 households in Village 2. Thus, a total of 374 interviewees
responded to the survey questionnaire. Where possible, male and female adults in a
household were interviewed. Interviewees within the same household were interviewed
Map 1. Land use map of Village 1 including distribution of household survey by hamlets.
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separately to minimise the influence that other housemates or partner(s) had on an inter-
viewee’s responses.
Political trust variables
Table 2 presents the trust variables and how they were coded for analysis. These standard
trust in government variables have been used in other studies on political trust.36 To link
the LSLIs and the public institutions, we used the ‘support LSLIs’ variable. Authors like
Suh et al., have used the LCA approach to classify individuals based on their trust in
public and non-public (or private) institutions.37
Map 2. Land use map of Village 1 including distribution of household survey by hamlets.
Table 1. Description of interviewees by age, gender, and educational level.













Primary level education 307
Secondary level education and above 39
Only informal training or apprenticeship 14
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These rigorous data collection techniques helped minimise measurement errors in our
political trust analysis and develop a clear narrative of LSLI schemes in these commu-
nities. In the next section, we start by building an argumentative groundwork of the poli-
tics of LSLIs and how it may contribute to the support of developmental nationalism
under Magufuli in rural Tanzania.
How local politics becomes entangled in the politics of large-scale land
investments
In this section, we present empirical data on how local political economies become
entangled in the politics of LSLIs and highlight how the developmentalist perception of
the state officials as being ‘responsible for, but not to, citizens’ creates animosity
between public institutions and local communities.38 In terms of periodisation, we
focus on the discourse from the late 1980s, when the first half of the land in Village 1
was acquired. This is a period which coincided with the introduction of neoliberal pol-
icies in Tanzania. We also highlight the formation of the TIC following the enactment of
the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act and look at the broken promises and adverse out-
comes that accompanied LSLIs projects under the Kikwete regime (2005–2015). Under-
standing how and why people act in politics and why there is support for developmental
nationalism in these local communities demands that history be understood from the
standpoint of its agents.39
The acquisition of the 1,999 ha piece of land in Village 1 happened in two phases. The
acquisition of the first half of the land, 404 ha (see Map 1), occurred in 1984 when Tan-
zania transitioned from a socialist regime to a neoliberal political economy.40 The second
half comprising 1,595 ha was acquired in 2011 when the Kikwete administration
launched the SAGCOT scheme.41 The 20,000 ha of land in Village 2 (see Map 2) was
acquired in 2010. These periods were marked by an active invitation to and support
for private investors in agriculture.42
Nelson et al. regard the increase in the competition for land by foreign and local inves-
tors in Tanzania as an outcome of political and economic changes, which themselves led
to the liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy 1980s.43 Ngoitiko et al. argue that the
reforms in the 1980s gave rise to an unprecedented period of land grabbing in Tanza-
nia.44 These debates, including those of the 2015 electoral campaign, are thus not new.
The re-emergence of the discourse in the 2015 general elections merely extended and
reproduced ongoing debates over land and investments in Tanzania.45 What follows is
a review of the political and economic changes and how these changes contributed to
LSLIs at the local level.
Table 2. Trust in government variable used for latent class analysis.
No Variable Likert scale for all variables Coding for LCA for all variables
1 Trust in the
President
1 = a great deal, 2 = a lot, 3 = a moderate amount,
4 = a little, 5 = none at all, −9 = prefer not to say
If response <3, code as 1 = Trust.
Otherwise, code as 0 = do not trust
2 Trust in the ruling
party (CCM)
3 Trust in opposition
parties.
4 Support LSLIs
5 Trust in TIC
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Political competition and the introduction of neo-liberal policies
The ‘shift to an open market economy in the 1980s meant that Tanzania now had a gov-
ernment which supported private investments’.46 To obtain structural adjustment loans,
President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–1995) adjusted the developmental ambitions of Tan-
zania to the conditionalities of foreign financiers, including the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.47 These conditions included: (1) the devaluation of the
Tanzanian shilling;48 (2) changes in the political structure, introduced by the 1991 Zan-
zibar Declaration and multipartyism;49 and (3) changes in the investment regulatory fra-
mework, including investment and private property laws.50
By 1991, state subsidies provided to farmers were suspended under the Economic
Recovery Programme (ERP).51 Introduced in 1986, the ERP encouraged private sector
engagement in agriculture and reduced state interference in the market.52 As part of the
ERP, the Civil Society Reform Programme of 1991 was implemented in 1993,53 and pub-
licly owned enterprises were liquidated and acquired mainly by the business elite.54 These
economic and political changes led to widespread redundancies in the public service and
increasing inequality between the business elite and rural sections of society.55
Consequently, political debates about the expansion of the economy became
entangled in what Aminzade refers to as the ‘indigenisation debates’.56 For example,
in the mid-1990s, opposition party leaders like Rev. Christopher Mtikila of the Demo-
cratic Party described Tanzanians of Asian and Arab origin as thieves and looters of
the country’s wealth (gabacholis) at the expense of indigenous Africans or the downtrod-
den people (mkombozi wa walahoi).57 The economically better-off Tanzanians, mainly of
Asian origin, were seen as better able to acquire assets while the impoverished (African)
majority became further economically marginalised in their ancestral land.58
It is argued that Tanzanians of Asian origin were economically privileged to acquire
significant private assets and became the new proprietors of many state-owned enter-
prises in the wake of economic liberalisation.59 In a seemingly strategic move, ruling pol-
itical party leaders like Idi Simba began substituting the indigenisation rhetoric as a
struggle against foreign interference.60 Here, indigenisation drew a difference between
citizens and foreigners.61 The indigenisation rhetoric became a populist tool to gain pol-
itical support by advocating for the protection of the nation’s economy and culture from
the threat of foreign domination.62
The rising inequality legitimised the indigenisation debates and remained a dominant
issue in the newly established multiparty system.63 Mwenye Busara (not his real name), a
70-year-old key informant in Village 1, remembers the socio-political changes during this
period. Mr Merali, of Asian origin, benefited from the newly liberalised economy in the
1980s and was able to acquire the piece of land in this Ruvuma village. Mwenye Busara
and a group of the village elders acquiesced to the transfer of 404 ha of land to Mr Merali
in 1984. ‘We were young when our land was taken. I was 36 years old. He [Merali] told us
that he would bring jobs and develop our village’.64
Changes to investment and land laws for increased private sector engagement
By 1993, recognising the need for legal and institutional reforms to ‘facilitate an enabling
environment for enhanced private sector participation’, the government announced the
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establishment of the Legal Sector Task Force led by Mark Bomani.65 According to the
Bomani report, ‘market-oriented economic reforms could not be implemented in the
absence of a “sophisticated”, legal or regulatory framework capable of meeting the exact-
ing challenges of a “modern” market economy’.66 Consequently, the 1990 Investment
Promotion and Protection Act, which protected the local industry, was scrapped and
formed the basis for enacting the 1997 Investment Act.67 To appease advocates calling
for the indigenisation of the economy, vocal proponent and businessman, Idi Simba,
was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1999.68 After his appointment,
opposition party parliamentarians joined ‘CCM backbenchers to support the National
Employment Promotion Service Act of 1999’, which introduced measures designed to
require foreign investors to enter into business partnerships with Tanzanian citizens.69
This encouraged the link between foreign investors and local business people, in what
authors like Shivji have described as compradorialism.70
The new 1997 Tanzania Investment Act led to the creation of the TIC as a one-stop-
shop to facilitate the acquisition of land and investment certificates for investors.71 These
legislative and institutional changes opened up all sectors of the economy for investment.
Significantly, the 1997 Investment Act abolished the protection of local industries that
was provisioned in the 1990 Investment Promotion and Protection Act. ‘The best invest-
ment law this country has ever had, and which gave locals a fair opportunity for invest-
ments, was the 1990 Investment Promotion Act. Surprisingly, Tanzanians spearheaded
the change of the law… they were just a group of comprador guys’.72 To authors like
Zoomers and Nelson et al., the interest in land investments was a consequence of ‘the
liberalisation of land markets, which became a major policy goal in the 1990s’.73 The lib-
eralisation of the economy responded and contributed to the commodification of land
and other natural resources.
Additionally, the absence of robust regulatory and oversight institutions allowed
corrupt politicians and institutions to engage in rent-seeking with devastating conse-
quences for the economy.74 For example, the Local Government Reform Act of
1998, which was introduced to decentralise decision-making processes within govern-
ment, failed to yield a veritable devolution of power due to political and institutional
constraints.75 Significantly though, changes to land laws in 1999 introduced the over-
sight mechanism needing the consent of the village assembly, i.e. all village adults
above 18 years of age, for any transfer of land to a potential investor. However, the
1999 land laws left the administration of village land transactions under district
authorities.76
In principle, the 1999 Village Land Act of Tanzania provides for the separation of
power between the Village Assembly and the Village Council, as the bases for village-
level governance.77 However, local elites, including government officials, continued to
perceive village community members as the objects of development and recipients of
orders from above rather than co-partners in decision-making processes.78 The land
reforms in 1999 were criticised as ‘being too focussed on enhancing economic
growth’, with the aim to enhance the productivity and profitability of the agricultural
sector as stated in the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy of 2001.79 For instance,
the Strategic Plan for Implementation of Land Laws (SPILL) criticised pastoralists and
smallholder farmers for not contributing to agricultural productivity and economic
growth.80
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With the transition to multiparty democracy in 1995, corruption became a significant
driver of change in Tanzania.81 Continued inefficiencies in institutional and regulatory
frameworks in the wake of market-led investments affected the functioning of state insti-
tutions. The implementation of the land law reforms remained problematic because of
the inadequate resources and limited capacity at the local and national level, including
the Ministry of Lands.82 The falsification of VAT receipts at the Tanzania Revenue Auth-
ority to the tune of 15 million dollars per annum in 200383 and increasing tax exemption
cases of approximately 178 million dollars in 2001 contributed to losses in tax revenue by
the government.84
By 2005, when Kikwete became President, the contradictions between the ideas of the
ruling class and the lived experiences of common Tanzanians had become profound.85 A
review of the Tanzanian Development Vision (TDV) 2025 by Mashindano et al. (2011)
showed that the rate of economic growth that had followed economic liberalisation did
not correlate with poverty reduction and improved livelihoods for ordinary Tanza-
nians.86 Many investment projects had failed to materialise into profitable economic
opportunities for smallholder farmers.87 For example, the land whichMrMerali acquired
in Village 1 remained vacant till 2011. ‘We accept that we gave the land to Merali. We
gave [it to] him because he promised to bring jobs and develop our village. So, we did
not go to that land since it was no longer our land’.88 The increasing poverty levels led
the government to allocate appropriate resources for accelerated sustainable and inclus-
ive economic growth. The outcome was an increase in LSLI schemes and a focus on the
commercialisation of agriculture, which, according to Kelsall, became populist vehicles
for promises during election campaigns.89
Broken promises
Following the increasing focus on LSLIs under President Kikwete’s administration and
the global land rush after the 2007/2008 food crisis,90 legal and institutional processes
were often undermined, making customarily held land vulnerable to loss and disposses-
sion.91 By 2009, an estimated 4 million hectares of land was requested from the Tanza-
nian government, through the TIC, with about 640,000 ha having been formally allocated
to investors.92 In August 2009, President Kikwete launched the Kilimo Kwanza – ‘Agri-
culture First’ strategy as a national resolve to accelerate agriculture transformation in
Tanzania by ‘providing incentives to attract more agricultural investors’.93
The Kilimo Kwanza strategy was Kikwete’s plan for how commercialised agriculture
would contribute to economic growth.94 As part of the Kilimo Kwanza, the SAGCOT was
launched in May 2010.95 The SAGCOT encompasses Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa,
Mbeya, Ruvuma, Njombe, Rukwa & Katavi, and is supported by the G8′s (now G7) New
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition Strategy.96 Transnational corporations (TNCs)
like Yara, Monsanto, Bayer Crop Science, Syngenta, Unilever, the World Bank, and the
US’s Feed the Future strongly supported the initiative.97
While an objective of most governments in developing countries is to attract much-
needed capital through FDI, the benefits of the commercialisation of agriculture
remain debatable in these countries, and institutional performance can influence
support for such policy interventions in the short and longer term.98 The launch of
the SAGCOT introduced the second phase of the land acquisition in Village 1, only
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this time, without the knowledge and consent of village members. ‘We were shocked
when we received a letter from the village executive officer (VEO), restricting us from
accessing the land on the left side of the road’.99 The son of the now-deceased Merali
returned to the village in 2011 to claim his father’s land (404 ha), including an additional
1,595 ha of land on the left-hand side of the road, the ‘Luchini area’ (see Map 1).
Land laws in Tanzania remain highly centralised, such that the President can acquire
any land for any public purpose.100 Land transfer processes remained political, and rural
communities have been dispossessed of land frequently, with the ‘public interest’ used to
justify land expropriation.101 It came as a surprise to Mwenye Busara and his fellow
village members that this investor claimed an additional 1,595 ha.
When the current investor came, we were grown up. We witnessed a massive conflict
between the investor and us [sic]. Of course, as villagers, we did not offer our consent (to
the 1,595 ha), but we had to give [it] up because all our efforts yielded no results. We
struggled by writing several letters to the authorities to bring back our land, especially the
land on the left side of the Road [the Luchini area]. The poison of our grabbed land is
still in our hearts.102
Similarly, the land in Village 2 was acquired in 2010, and village members have since been
barred from accessing the piece of land, which also functioned as their cemetery. Indeed,
several LSLI deals in Tanzania have been reported to disregard village members in
support of investors who possessed capital for investment and development.103 A
research participant described the investor in Village 2 as ‘just a cunning man’. That is
why he got the land. ‘He took advantage of our illiteracy. None of his promises was
fulfilled!’ FGD participants said the only useful thing for them when the land was trans-
ferred were the ‘promises he made to us’.104
In many cases, like in Village 1 and 2, contestation over access to land is often spurred
by an investment and development agenda which undermines rural communities’
control over their land and other productive resources.105 The focus on the commercia-
lisation of agriculture serves as a vehicle for local political elites to pursue a developmen-
talist agenda and see themselves as empowered to rule for the good of society and treat
village communities as marginally competent political agents.106 The political imagin-
ation of the state elite is often expressed in deeply paternalistic and hierarchical terms,
with their ‘knowledge’ and ‘modern’ agency placed alongside the ‘ignorance’ and ‘back-
wardness’ of village members.107
Unsurprisingly, rural communities like Village 1 and 2 become political hotspots to
boost popular support for public policies towards poverty reduction and income gener-
ation through the commercialisation of agriculture. It explains the visit of President
Kikwete to Village 1 in 2014, where he raised the expectations of community members
by saying that he had directed government institutions to increase the pace of poverty
reduction in the country, which could be done through investments such as the newly
established large-scale farm in the village.108 While conducting research in Village 1,
the first author overheard a local police officer remark that ‘village members have a
low IQ’, and that this research was introducing ideas that could cause them to riot
against the investor and the government.109 However weak the material evidence of
such claims, they find resonance in wider Tanzanian society by linking LSLIs to
poverty reduction, employment, and local communities’ rights.110 For example, in
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August 2011, during a parliamentary session, MPs such as John Cheyo of the United
Democratic Party questioned the country’s land laws for ‘allowing foreign investors to
hold large chunks of land while natives are marginalised’.111 There is a general perception
that LSLIs are often linked to a corrupt political elite and foreign investors at the expense
of disadvantaged local communities.112 The increase in land conflicts between investors
and local communities disenfranchises local communities from the ‘benefits’ of LSLI in
various parts of Tanzania.113
The dire food insecurity experiences of research participants in Village 1 and 2 are
documented in a separate paper.114 For example, when Mwenye Busara was interviewed,
he was weaving a basket from raffia-like twines, which he planned to exchange for 4 kg of
maize per basket, maize being the staple in Ruvuma. Over 90% of research participants
from the household survey in Village 1 and 2 described maize-based stiff porridge (ugali)
as the staple within their households, often eaten on a daily basis. Ugali is usually
accompanied by vegetables and fish. Halfway into the interview, Busara requested
some food from one of the research assistants. Busara was hungry, and his daughter
who is also his care, with whom he lives in a tiny mud hut, had left for work on the
large-scale farm. Over 47% of interviewees reported experiences of being severely food
insecure.115 This represents the socio-economic situation in Village 1, where many of
its members are labourers in what is now a large agribusiness.
During the FGD in Village 1, community members seemed to have given up on the
struggles to defend their land. ‘This is a massive investment, and you cannot fight it
with the money from begging [sic]. For our chairman to go to town to follow up
[these issues], he has to borrow the transport fare from various shops within the
village’.116 The failures of investment and economic policies in Tanzania legitimise
support for the nationalist turn in Tanzania today. Poncian argues that the crisis of legiti-
macy of the neoliberal orthodoxy is leading to a rise of nationalism in many countries,
including Tanzania.117 During this research, it became clear that village members associ-
ated anything to do with investments as the failures of the TIC, which explains the low
level of trust in ‘old order’ laissez-fair institutions vis-à-vis Magufuli’s new developmental
nationalism approach. ‘When a leader [Magufuli] comes as a sovereign state and rejects
things that do not align with the state’s sovereignty, he must correct them. Correct those
things so that Tanzanian natural resources are exploited to help Tanzanians [not
foreigners]’.118 For the majority of smallholders in village communities, Magufuli’s
actions were viewed as a solution to what Amin describes as the systematic exclusion
of smallholders from a capitalist-oriented economy.119
President Magufuli’s election also came against the background of a political climate
marred by high-level corruption scandals and distrust in the public institutions in Tan-
zania.120 The private interests of state elites, as argued by Nelson et al., became entangled
with the development of elite capture and patronage-based politics in Tanzania.121 For
example, Pelizzon and Bekenova provide detailed accounts of some of the high profile
scandals, including the Richmond scandal, the Bank of Tanzania’s (BoT) External
Payment of Arrears (EPA) scandal, the Escrow scandal, and the BoT’s twin tower
inflation scandal.122 According to a report by The Monitor, these scandals had robbed
the taxpayer of Shs. 527 Billion (229 million USD).123 Cooksey describes how the
Escrow-Richmond scandal, which ran from 1992 and involved several high-ranking poli-
ticians and businessmen, including former prime minister Edward Lowassa, cost the
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Tanzania public vast sums of money only to benefit ‘opportunistic rent-seekers’.124 These
scandals, symptomatic of the high level of corruption within Tanzania, contributed to
considerable disillusionment and distrust in the legitimacy of the ruling elite.
Additionally, in-fighting between members of the ruling political party CCM led to the
resignation of Prime Minister Lowassa in 2008 due to his alleged involvement in the
Richmond Scandal.125 This paved the way for the ascent to the top job of the then Min-
ister of Works (from 2010 to 2015), John P. Magufuli, who had gained a reputation as a
no-nonsense Minister, an approach which earned him the nickname ‘the bulldozer’.
Magufuli’s first years in office were dedicated to building political support by introducing
popular social policies such as free education for children between the age of 8 and 12 and
improved health services for the poor.126 He also focused on improving the public service
and curbing corruption while consolidating power at the helm of a weakened ruling pol-
itical party.127
His supporters have heralded this approach to investment policy and regulations
under the Magufuli government as attempts to redefine and rebalance Tanzania’s
relationship with investors. The pragmatism of President Magufuli’s fight against corrup-
tion and his ostensibly anti-establishment agenda propelled him to the head of a nation
and a ruling political party (CCM) that needed fundamental changes in structure – prin-
ciples, values and institutions – an image undoubtedly different from the neoliberal
reforms introduced in the late 1980s.128 In a report published in 2015 on the Agriculture
Sector Development Strategy of Tanzania, the government of Tanzania has acknowl-
edged that the focus on large commercial farms had made little contribution to the
reduction of poverty.129 Indeed, increasing levels of corruption and the seemingly immi-
nent disintegration of the ruling political party in the run-up to the 2015 elections paved
the way for President Magufuli, who would advocate for change, and disrupted the
business as usual approach in Tanzania.130 In the next section, we present the results
of our trust in government survey using the LCA.
Trust in institutions as a result of perceptions around LSLI
In this section, we present the results from the LCA using the trust in government survey
responses. Respondents were classified using approaches suggested by Vrieze and Suh
et al.131 We ran several models in R using a different number of classes to categorise
survey respondents. The analysis showed that our respondents could best be categorised
into three classes. The statistical software generates the conditional item response prob-
abilities per variable and the estimated class population share for each class (see Table 3).
The calculated size of each class (ni) = Estimate class population * total number of
observations (n), where i is the class number. From Table 3, we define the various
classes as follows:
. Class 1: Class 1 respondents have a neutral tendency towards LSLIs and the President,
and the TIC. Some 31% of respondents fall in Class 1. Individuals in Class 1 are 96%
likely to trust the President, 94% likely to trust CCM, 66% likely to trust opposition
parties, 97% likely to trust the TIC and 64% likely to support LSLIs in the community.
. Class 2: Individuals in Class 2 are less likely to support LSLI in the community (9%).
This class makes up 44% of the sample population and are 99% likely to trust the
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President, 97% likely to trust CCM, 35% likely to trust opposition parties, and 0%
likely to trust the TIC.
. Class 3: Individuals in Class 3 tend to distrust any public institution and LSLIs. Class 3
makes up 25% of the sample and are 40% likely to trust the President, 16% likely to
trust CCM, 9% likely to trust opposition parties, 3% likely to trust TIC and 22%
likely to support LSLIs in the community.
Difference between classes
Using McNemar’s Z-test,132 we then determined if there is any significant difference
between Class 1, where participants are likely to support LSLIs, and Class 2 and 3
where participants are less likely to support LSLIs. In doing so, we set the hypothesis
for the differences in classes.
Firstly, by inferring from our data, the proportion of those who do not support LSLI in
the community (Class 2 and 3) is greater than the proportion of those who support LSLIs
(Class 1). Therefore, we set the null hypothesis to test whether those who support LSLI in
the rural community (i.e. Class 1) is statistically different to those who do not support
LSLIs in the rural community (i.e. Class 2 and 3). There, we execute two hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis test 1:McNemar′s Z score = (n2–n1)/√(n2 + n1)
Hypothesis test 2:McNemar′s Z score = (n3–n1)/√(n3 + n1)
From Tables 4 and 5, given that Class 1 is greater than or equal to Class 3, but always less
than Class 2, we conclude that the population proportion in Class 2, which is the highest
proportion of our sample, do not support LSLIs but support the President. This, there-
fore, supports our claim that despite the promises made within LSLI schemes, commu-
nity members are disillusioned by the broken promises and would support a president
who purports to fight against institutions like the TIC that are linked to these LSLI
deals and schemes. Community members are more likely to support the President,
























Class 1 0.96 0.04 0.94 0.06 0.66 0.34 0.97 0.03 0.64 0.36 0.31 115
Class 2 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.03 0.35 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.91 0.44 164
Class 3 0.40 0.60 0.16 0.84 0.09 0.91 0.03 0.97 0.22 0.78 0.25 94
*number of observations (n): 374, number of estimated parameters: 17 residual degrees of freedom: 14.





Critical at 95% CI Interpretation
1. H0: Class 1≥
Class 2
Ha: Class 1 <
Class 2
−1.66 −1.64 Z score falls within the rejection zone. We fail to accept null and
accept our original claim that those who support LSLI in Class 1,
is always less than those who do not support LSLI in Class 2.
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whose approach to investments had elements of developmental nationalism and
expresses himself as the leader of the downtrodden. On the other hand, community
members are not likely to support LSLIs or trust the TIC, represented here as an ‘old
order’ laissez-faire institution.
Conclusions
The involvement of state agents in land transactions can transform land investments into
a tool for politicians to garner political support. These land transactions contribute to
questions about legitimacy and government representation within local political econ-
omies. Additionally, the vulnerable position of customary land within statist land
tenure regimes pits local communities against local government officials who continue
to regard them as incompetent political agents. The negative impacts of LSLIs on the
rights of local communities, and the absence of adequate political tools oriented to
holding investors accountable for the promises made to local people, place public insti-
tutions and citizens in a constant struggle for political legitimacy and support.
While political trust is a highly normative and subjective concept, the use of a case
study approach minimises measurement errors that may occur when measuring political
trust across different cultural and regime settings. From the LCA performed it this study,
it is evident that there is a difference in support for the president and ‘old order’ laissez-
faire institutions. Results show that rural communities can be categorised into three
classes with 31% of rural community members 64% likely support LSLIs. Another 44%
are 9% likely to support LSLIs. The third class, 25%, are 22% likely to support LSLIs.
In all three classes, community members are more than 95% likely to support the Presi-
dent. While the research does not investigate the successes and failures of developmental
nationalism under President Magufuli; it shows that rural communities impacted by
LSLIs are likely to support a developmental nationalism approach to investments in Tan-
zania. Such support or trust is dependent on people’s normative expectations towards
public institutions linked to LSLIs. For years, local communities have been disillusioned
by the promises made within these investment schemes, which are often presented as a
means to increase FDI, farmers’ incomes, technology transfer, and job creation. The
negative impacts of LSLIs on the rights of local communities and the absence of adequate
political tools, which are oriented to holding investors accountable for the goals promised
to local people, underpin the popular support for the nationalist turn in Tanzania today.
To local communities impacted by LSLIs, Magufuli’s actions were viewed as a solution
to the systematic exclusion of smallholders from a capitalist-oriented economy. Magufuli
instrumentalised this variant form of developmental nationalism as a political tool to
increase political support among rural communities. His developmental nationalism





Critical at 95% CI Interpretation
2. H0: Class 1≥
Class 3
Ha: Class 1 <
Class 3
1.53 −1.64 Z score falls within the acceptance zone we fail to reject the null
and conclude that the proportion of those who support LSLI,
Class 1, is not always less than those Class 3.
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was versatile and mutable, and legitimised his authoritarian rule in the eyes of his sup-
porters as a fight for the poor against a corrupt political and business elite.
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